In the past three years, Nigeria has witnessed a pattern of political decision making that has left many citizens asking a difficult but necessary question: what qualifies someone to lead a nation of over 200 million people through complex economic, security, and social challenges? The issue is no longer merely about ideology or party loyalty. It is increasingly about capacity, judgment, and fitness to govern.
Several high profile decisions illustrate the concern. When Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared at his inauguration that “fuel subsidy is gone,” the announcement triggered immediate economic shock. Prices surged, transport costs doubled or tripled, and inflation climbed above 30 percent within a year. While subsidy reform had long been advocated by economists, the abruptness of the decision and the absence of a clearly operational cushioning framework imposed severe hardship on ordinary Nigerians. The issue was not reform itself, it was the manner and timing of its execution.
That pattern continued. Currency liberalisation and subsidy removal were implemented almost simultaneously, amplifying inflationary pressure in an import dependent economy. Electricity tariff increases followed in the midst of this crisis, compounding household and institutional strain. These were not isolated policies, they formed a sequence of decisions that, taken together, suggest weak coordination and insufficient anticipation of cumulative impact.
Legislative actions have raised similar concerns. Under the leadership of Tajudeen Abbas, proposals such as the Counter Subversion Bill and a compulsory voting law complete with jail terms for non participation were introduced and then withdrawn after widespread backlash. These initiatives reflected a troubling tendency toward coercive solutions to complex democratic problems, rather than structural reforms addressing insecurity, distrust, and institutional weakness. Their rapid reversal further suggested that they had not been adequately stress tested before reaching the national stage.
At the subnational level, governance has also reflected this pattern. Nyesom Wike oversaw demolition campaigns in Abuja that displaced thousands, accompanied by statements dismissing public protest and criticism. Infrastructure and urban order are legitimate goals of government, but the dismissal of stakeholder concerns and humanitarian consequences raises serious questions about proportionality and judgment in execution.
Even more consequential were decisions affecting democratic structure itself. The declaration of emergency rule in Rivers State by President Tinubu, supported in the National Assembly under Godswill Akpabio and Abbas, suspended elected officials and triggered widespread legal and political controversy. Whether justified or not, the move represented a dramatic escalation in executive power, with implications for democratic stability and public trust.
Across these examples, a pattern emerges. Abrupt, high impact decisions without adequate sequencing or buffering. Punitive or coercive responses to systemic problems. Policy rigidity in the face of visible harm. Institutional shortcuts in high stakes decisions.
These are not merely political missteps. They are indicators of deficits in governance capacity, specifically in judgment, impulse control, risk calibration, and systems thinking.
Nigeria already imposes minimum requirements for political office such as age, citizenship, and educational thresholds. Yet these criteria say little about whether a leader can process complex information, regulate decision making under pressure, anticipate downstream consequences, or adapt when policies begin to fail. In any other high stakes domain such as aviation, medicine, or engineering, such competencies are not assumed, they are rigorously assessed.
The idea of evaluating the fitness to lead of politicians is understandably controversial. It raises legitimate concerns about misuse, politicisation, and the risk of weaponising mental health. But the alternative, continuing without any structured assessment of decision making capacity, carries its own risks, as recent events demonstrate.
A meaningful approach would not focus narrowly on psychiatric diagnosis. Instead, it would assess functional competencies essential to governance, including executive functioning, impulse control, emotional regulation, risk assessment, proportionality, and the capacity to integrate expert advice and adapt policy.
Such assessments could be embedded within broader governance reforms, transparent, standardised, and insulated from partisan control. They would not replace elections but rather complement democratic choice with baseline safeguards, much like financial disclosures or eligibility screening.
Nigeria stands at a critical juncture. The country’s challenges including economic instability, insecurity, and institutional fragility require leadership that is not only well intentioned but demonstrably capable. The recent record suggests that capacity can no longer be assumed.
The question, then, is not whether Nigeria can afford to examine the fitness of its leaders. It is whether it can afford not to.
Garbs
April 8, 2026